Events
19 April 2023
Speaker: Marta Halina, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
Title: Major Transitions in Cognitive Evolution
Abstract: As we come to appreciate the wealth and diversity of intelligences, the challenge becomes how to make sense of this complexity. How can we comprehend it in a systematic way? In a recent collaboration with researchers in Australia, we argue that one important piece of the puzzle involves treating the evolution of cognition as a series of major evolutionary transitions. Each transition involved a qualitative change in information processing within nervous systems. Each transition gave rise to new cognitive capacities, while transforming the power and scope of existing cognitive functions. In this talk, I introduce our major transitions framework and discuss the virtues of this approach over other accounts.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
Speaker: Marta Halina, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
Title: Major Transitions in Cognitive Evolution
Abstract: As we come to appreciate the wealth and diversity of intelligences, the challenge becomes how to make sense of this complexity. How can we comprehend it in a systematic way? In a recent collaboration with researchers in Australia, we argue that one important piece of the puzzle involves treating the evolution of cognition as a series of major evolutionary transitions. Each transition involved a qualitative change in information processing within nervous systems. Each transition gave rise to new cognitive capacities, while transforming the power and scope of existing cognitive functions. In this talk, I introduce our major transitions framework and discuss the virtues of this approach over other accounts.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
03 May 2023
Speaker: Pascal Boyer, Departments of Psychology and Anthropology, Washington University in St. Louis
Title: The anthropology of misfortune - why people blame victims, invent taboos and imagine witchcraft
Abstract: In most human cultures people are motivated to explain misfortune, sometimes in terms of gods and spirits, of taboo violations, and of the machinations of witches. In many modern societies, people routinely blame the victims of illness, assault and accidents. Why do we do all that? I argue that in an evolutionary psychology perspective, these various responses to misfortune are based on a common motivation, connected to the human need for cooperation and reputation. Cross-cultural surveys and psychology experiments seem to support this interpretation of common views of misfortune.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
Speaker: Pascal Boyer, Departments of Psychology and Anthropology, Washington University in St. Louis
Title: The anthropology of misfortune - why people blame victims, invent taboos and imagine witchcraft
Abstract: In most human cultures people are motivated to explain misfortune, sometimes in terms of gods and spirits, of taboo violations, and of the machinations of witches. In many modern societies, people routinely blame the victims of illness, assault and accidents. Why do we do all that? I argue that in an evolutionary psychology perspective, these various responses to misfortune are based on a common motivation, connected to the human need for cooperation and reputation. Cross-cultural surveys and psychology experiments seem to support this interpretation of common views of misfortune.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
[CANCELLED]
10 May 2023
Speaker: Nicola Clayton, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge
Title: TBD - The Evolution of Cognition
Abstract: TBD
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
10 May 2023
Speaker: Nicola Clayton, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge
Title: TBD - The Evolution of Cognition
Abstract: TBD
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
17 May 2023
Speaker: Kate Jeffery, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Glasgow
Title: Cognitive Maps in Mice and Menschen
Abstract: The notion of the “cognitive map” was introduced by Tolman in the 1940s to explain why rats are able to solve tasks in a way that seems to imply some kind of internal representation of space. The term has been a fraught one in philosophy and cognitive science, but the discovery of place cells in the 1970s seemed to suggest that Tolman was right, at least somewhat. This talk will explore this finding, and the ones that came after (including latterly in mice and in humans) and argue that there is a cognitive map, but that it is not a “map” in the usual sense. The representation of space instead seems very variable, and dependent on the environment structure, perhaps because of the constraints this places on actions. This notion approaches the emerging “enactivist” view of cognition, and causes us to re-think how we internally represent space.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
Speaker: Kate Jeffery, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Glasgow
Title: Cognitive Maps in Mice and Menschen
Abstract: The notion of the “cognitive map” was introduced by Tolman in the 1940s to explain why rats are able to solve tasks in a way that seems to imply some kind of internal representation of space. The term has been a fraught one in philosophy and cognitive science, but the discovery of place cells in the 1970s seemed to suggest that Tolman was right, at least somewhat. This talk will explore this finding, and the ones that came after (including latterly in mice and in humans) and argue that there is a cognitive map, but that it is not a “map” in the usual sense. The representation of space instead seems very variable, and dependent on the environment structure, perhaps because of the constraints this places on actions. This notion approaches the emerging “enactivist” view of cognition, and causes us to re-think how we internally represent space.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
14 June 2023
Speaker: Sam Clarke, Philosophy , Psychology & Linguistics, UPENN; Philosophy, USC
Title: Number Adaptation - A Critical Look
Abstract: A received view in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy is that humans visually adapt to the number of items in seen collections. This conclusion is motivated by more than 30 published studies, is supported by phenomenologically compelling illustrations, and is often used to motivate weighty claims about the contents of experience and the function of perception. If you had asked me only very recently, I would have told you that the existence of number adaptation was decisively established many times over. However, this talk takes a sceptical look at the phenomenon. After noting several results which sit awkwardly with the existence of genuine number adaptation, I offer an independently motivated hypothesis which can account for many reported cases of number adaptation: on this view, the visual system simply filters out ‘old news’ such that observers fail to see test items that are visually identified with those previously registered in adaptor displays, but in no case does it adapt to their numerical quantity. After introducing this hypothesis, and clarifying how it would explain paradigm cases of 'number adaptation', I describe a series of experimental studies (run with Sami Yousif and Elizabeth Brannon) that consistently bear out the predictions of our 'old news' hypothesis while consistently undermining received formulations of the number adaptation hypothesis. On inspection, it turns out that there is no compelling reason to think number adaptation exists.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
Speaker: Sam Clarke, Philosophy , Psychology & Linguistics, UPENN; Philosophy, USC
Title: Number Adaptation - A Critical Look
Abstract: A received view in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy is that humans visually adapt to the number of items in seen collections. This conclusion is motivated by more than 30 published studies, is supported by phenomenologically compelling illustrations, and is often used to motivate weighty claims about the contents of experience and the function of perception. If you had asked me only very recently, I would have told you that the existence of number adaptation was decisively established many times over. However, this talk takes a sceptical look at the phenomenon. After noting several results which sit awkwardly with the existence of genuine number adaptation, I offer an independently motivated hypothesis which can account for many reported cases of number adaptation: on this view, the visual system simply filters out ‘old news’ such that observers fail to see test items that are visually identified with those previously registered in adaptor displays, but in no case does it adapt to their numerical quantity. After introducing this hypothesis, and clarifying how it would explain paradigm cases of 'number adaptation', I describe a series of experimental studies (run with Sami Yousif and Elizabeth Brannon) that consistently bear out the predictions of our 'old news' hypothesis while consistently undermining received formulations of the number adaptation hypothesis. On inspection, it turns out that there is no compelling reason to think number adaptation exists.
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
27 June 2023
Speaker: Victor Kumar, Department of Philosophy, Boston University
Title: TBD - The Evolution of Morality
Abstract: TBD
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
Speaker: Victor Kumar, Department of Philosophy, Boston University
Title: TBD - The Evolution of Morality
Abstract: TBD
Time: 4-6pm
Location: Sir Henry Stephenson Building, LT2, University of Sheffield
